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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SERBAN P. RUSE, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-21769 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 100, 
and NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondents. 
SERBAN P. RUSE, for Charging Party 
) O'DONNELL, SCHWARTZ, L L P . (ELIZABETH PILECKI of counsel), for 
Respondent 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBERT K. DRINAN of 
counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by Serban P. Ruse to an 
Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) determination dismissing an improper practice charge 
alleging, as amended, that the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) and the Transit 
Workers Union, Local 100 (TWU) violated, respectively, §§209-a.1(a) and (c) and §209-
a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when NYCTA terminated his 
employment and TWU refused to provide him with representation to defend himself or 
) to respond to his communications. 
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Exceptions 
Ruse excepted on the grounds that the determination was contrary to the 
testimony and the evidence presented. He also excepted on the ground that, since the 
determination was made at the close of his case, further evidence and testimony was 
excluded.1 
Facts 
A hearing took place on November 21, 2000, at which time Ruse presented his 
direct case. At the conclusion of his direct case, NYCTA and TWU moved to dismiss 
the improper practice charges. At that juncture, the ALJ closed the hearing and 
provided the parties with the opportunity to file briefs addressed to the motion. The ALJ 
rendered a decision on March 1, 2001, dismissing the charges. 
We will confine our analysis to the salient facts relevant to our resolution of the 
issues. A detailed description of the facts is set forth in the ALJ's decision. 
Discussion 
In deciding the motion to dismiss, the ALJ correctly applied the standard we 
enunciated in County of Nassau (Police Dep't),2 that the ALJ "must assume the truth of 
all of the charging party's evidence and give the charging party the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences that could be drawn from those assumed facts." 
1Ruse fails, however, to specifically cite the testimony to which these exceptions 
refer. Our Rules of Procedure, §213.2(b)(1) through (4) require that the issues to be 
reviewed be set forth specifically and designate by page citation the portions of the 
record relied upon. 
217 PERB 1J3013, at 3029-30 (1984). 
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Ruse had alleged that NYCTA had violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act. After 
reviewing the record, and giving Ruse every favorable inference from the facts, we concur 
with the ALJ that Ruse failed to establish a prima facie case.3 He failed to establish that 
he was engaged in a protected activity. His only link to this element was testimony that he 
was asked by an unknown union representative to sign a petition to amend disciplinary 
procedures. In addition, he failed to establish the second element, that NYCTA had 
knowledge of this protected activity and, lastly, that it acted because of it. 
Ruse also charged that the TWU breached its duty of fair representation by failing 
to assist him in his efforts to regain his position with the NYCTA. 
Upon our review of the record, we find that Ruse failed to make a prima facie 
showing of arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct on the part of TWU.4 The record 
is replete with correspondence from the TWU to Ruse evidencing their communications 
with him. Furthermore, as the TWU pointed out in its brief on the motion to dismiss, the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement excluded from grievance arbitration the 
termination of employment of a probationary-employee. We have consistently held that 
we would not substitute our judgment for that of a union's regarding the filing and 
3See City of Salamanca, 18 PERB H3012, at 3027 (1985); see also State of 
New York (SUNY-Oswego), 34 PERB fl (2001), decided by us today, for an 
explanation of the burden of persuasion in a charge alleging a violation of §§209-a.1(a) 
and (c) of the Act. 
4See United Fed'n of Teachers (Ayazi), 32 PERB 1J3069 (1999); CSEA, Local 
1000, AFSCME (Heffelfinger); 32 PERB 1J3044 (1999); Public Employees Fed'n, AFL-
CIO and State of New York (Dep't of Health), 29 PERB 1J3027 (1996); CSEA v. PERB 
and Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1T7024 (3d Dep't 1987), affirmed on other grounds, 
73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB fl7017 (1988). 
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prosecution of grievances, for a union is given a wide range of reasonableness in this 
regard.5 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny Ruse's exceptions and we affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
: IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge, as amended, must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 1,2001 
Albany, New York 
sSee Public Employees Fed'n, supra note 4; see also District Council 37, 
AFSCME (Gonzalez), 28 PERB H3062 (1995). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, SUNY OSWEGO 
LOCAL 611, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-21694 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
NEW YORK - OSWEGO), 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN A. CRAIN 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROSS M. PISCITELLI 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on an exception filed by the State of New York (State 
University of New York - Oswego) (State) to a decision of the Assistant Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) which found that 
the State violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it issued counseling memoranda to Daniel Hoefer in retaliation for his having 
engaged in activities protected by the Act. 
EXCEPTION 
In its exception, the State does not challenge the Assistant Director's findings of 
fact. Instead, the exception relates solely to the Assistant Director's interpretation of 
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the law, as applied to the legitimate business reasons defense, and whether the State 
waived its right to assert such defense because it was not set forth as an affirmative 
defense in the State's answer. 
FACTS 
In view of the limited scope of the State's exception, the factual findings ma 
the Assistant Director are adopted in full and will not be repeated here.1 
DISCUSSION 
Based on our review of the record as it relates to the State's exception, and our 
consideration of the parties' arguments, we grant the State's exception and so modify 
the Assistant Director's decision to reflect that the legitimate business reasons defense 
need not be raised as an affirmative defense for the reasons that follow. 
The State in its exception raises an issue which, heretofore, we have not had to 
decide. Our Rules of Procedure (Rules) merely state that the contents of an answer 
shall include a specific admission, denial or explanation of each of the charging party's 
allegations. In addition, the answer shall include a specific, detailed statement of any 
affirmative defense.2 Notably, §204.3(c)(2) does not list the specific affirmative 
defenses to which it refers, except the timeliness defense when the alleged violation 
has occurred more than four months prior to the filing of the charge. By contrast, the 
Civil Practice Law and Rules of New York (CPLR) offers two alternative definitions of an 
affirmative defense, as well as a list of the most common affirmative defenses.3 We 
1See 34 PERB fl4509 (2001). 
2Rules of Procedure, §§204.3(c)(1) and (2). 
3CPLR§3018(b). 
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have adopted these CPLR definitions through our decision in New York City Transit 
Authority.4 Thus, we have defined an affirmative defense as "all matters which if not 
pleaded would be likely to take the adverse party by surprise or would raise issues of 
fact not appearing on the face of a prior pleading . . . ."5 
We..must consider theState's exceptionLJn Ijght of .CSEA|s charge. CSEA 
alleged that the State's actions, i.e. counseling, interfered with and discriminated 
against Hoefer in furtherance of a protected activity [co-chair of the Health and Safety 
Committee] and, that "but for" this protected activity, Hoefer would not have been 
counseled. The State's answer denied the material allegations of the charge, in effect, 
denying that its actions were improperly motivated, and set forth certain affirmative 
defenses. The State did not, however, allege as an affirmative defense "legitimate 
business reasons" for its counseling of Hoefer. 
Our improper practice jurisdiction began on September 1, 1969, with the addition 
of §209-a.1 to the Act. Shortly thereafter, in July 1970, we decided what was to 
become the seminal case involving interference and discrimination charges.6 In that 
case, the City of Albany merely interposed an answer denying the material allegations 
and set forth two affirmative defenses unrelated to legitimate business reasons. 
Notwithstanding the absence of such a defense, the hearing officer relied on a decision 
420 PERB 1J3037 (1987). 
5ld. at 3066, wherein the Board held that contract waiver is an affirmative 
defense and respondent's failure to raise the defense [in its answer] barred it from 
doing so at all. 
6City of Albany, 3 PERB 1J3096 (1970), confirmed as modified, 36 AD2d 348, 4 
PERB tf700_8 (3rd Dep't 1971), affirmed as modified, 29 NY2d 433, 5 PERB fl7000 
(1972), on remand, 5 PERB 1J3002 (1972). 
/ 
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of the United State Supreme Court which held that an employer may take action7 "for 
any reason other than union activity"8 or, as the Circuit Court of Appeals described it, 
"absent unlawful motivation an employer may act upon a good reason, poor reason or 
no reason at all."9 
Ourbody'_gf case lawin this ajea has evolved since ^ 
certain principles have remained constant. The burden of persuasion lies with the 
charging party to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the public 
employer acted with improper motivation.10 
We have consistently held that in order to establish such improper motivation, a 
charging party must prove that he had been engaged in protected activities, and that 
the respondent had knowledge of and acted because of those activities.11 If the 
charging party proves a prima facie case of improper motivation, the burden of going 
7
 City of Albany, 3 PERB 1f4507, at 4534 (1970). 
* Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 US 103, at 132 (1937). 
9NLRB v. Condenser Corp. of America, 10 LRRM 483, at 489 (1942). 
10See Board of Educ. of the City Sen. Dist. of the City of New York, 26 PERB 
U4555 (1993), aff'd 2Q PERB P082 (1993). 
"State of New York, 33 PERB P046 (2000); City of Utica, 33 PERB fl3039 
(2000); State of New York (SUNY Buffalo), 33 PERB 1J3020 (2000); Town of Ramapo, 
32 PERB H3077 (1999); City of Salamanca, 18 PERB tf3012 (1985). 
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forward shifts to the respondent to establish that its actions were motivated by 
legitimate business reasons.12,13 
Thus, "where the respondent meets its burden of producing evidence of a 
legitimate business reason for its action, a violation can only be found if the charging 
party has proven, by a preponderance of all the evidence that the respondents would not 
have taken the action 'but for' the protected activity."14 It has been our position, 
therefore, that the ultimate burden of persuasion always remains with the charging 
party. 
Until the instant decision, the introduction of evidence which would meet the 
respondent's burden of going forward in interference and discrimination cases has 
never been dependent upon legitimate business reasons being pled as an affirmative 
defense.15 As we noted in City of New Rochelle,™ 
"we have had from clientele . . . proposals to amend the 
Rules to require a respondent to affirmatively plead the 
nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions which are the 
subject of an improper practice charge. We have not 
adopted this pleading requirement out of a concern that it 
might compromise settlement efforts and distort the 
respective burdens of proof. It is also our opinion that a 
charging party's opportunity to move for particularization of 
the answer affords adequate protection against surprise and 
ensures that any required hearing proceeds efficiently." 
^City of Salamanca, supra, note 11. 
13David D. Siegel, New York Practice, §223 Affirmative Defenses. Under a 
denial, a [respondent] can disprove anything the [charging party] is required to prove. 
uBoard ofEduc. of the CitySch. Dist. of the City of New York, supra note 10, at 
4663. 
15Board ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, supra, note 10. 
1627 PERB P062, at 3144, n. 1 (1994). 
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The Assistant Director erred in his decision when he determined that the State had 
waived the defense of legitimate business reasons because it was not specifically set 
forth as an affirmative defense in its answer. 
As no exceptions were taken to the Assistant Director's findings of fact or his 
conclusions of law, except as heretofore mentioned, we are constrained by our Rules 
from reviewing those facts or conclusions.17 We hereby grant the State's limited 
exception to that portion of the Assistant Director's decision that identifies legitimate 
business reasons as an affirmative defense and, to his conclusion, that the State 
waived this defense because it was not raised in its answer.18 The Assistant Director's 
decision is affirmed in all other respects. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the State: 
.1. Cease and desist from issuing counseling memoranda to Hoefer because he 
contacted the local newspaper to rectify safety problems for unit employees 
occasioned by the location of its newspaper boxes. 
2. Forthwith rescind Santiago's March 24 and April 10, 2000 counseling 
memoranda to Hoefer and expunge from its files all references to them or to 
the relocation of the newspaper box incident. 
17Rules of Procedure, §213.6; see also Chenango Forks Cent. Sch. Dist, 29 
PERB 1J3058 (1996); City of Dunkirk, 23 PERB 1J3025 (1.990). 
18We need not remand the matter to take evidence as to the State's alleged 
legitimate business purposes. The Assistant Director accepted the State's evidence 
into the record and made an alternative finding based upon that evidence. 
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3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations normally used to 
communicate with employees at Oswego in the unit which includes Hoefer's 
position. 
DATED: May 1,2001 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
I John T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the State of New York (State University of New York - Oswego) (State) in the 
unit representedby the Civil ServiceEmployees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, SUNY Oswego 
Local 611 (CSEA) that the State will: 
1. Not issue counseling memoranda to Hoefer because he contacted the local newspaper 
to rectify safety problems for unit employees occasioned by the location of its newspaper 
boxes. 
2. Forthwith rescind Marta Santiago's March 24 and April 10, 2000 counseling memoranda 
) to Hoefer and expunge from its files all references to them or to the relocation of the 
newspaper box incident. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
STATE OF NEW YORK (SUNY-OSWEGO) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by 
any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 




- a n d - CASE NO. U-21790 
SCHUYLER-CHEMUNG-TIOGA BOARD OF 
COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, 
Respondent. 
JOHN SCHAMEL, for Charging Party 
JILLIAN R. LUTHER, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga 
Educational Association (Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) conditionally dismissing its improper practice charge which, as amended, alleged 
that the Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) 
had violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it refused to provide information requested by the Association in its investigation 
of a potential grievance. 
The ALJ noted that the failure to provide to an employee organization 
information that it is entitled to and which is necessary for it to administer a collective 
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bargaining agreement, including the processing of grievances, violates both §209-
a.1(a) and §209-a.1(d) of the Act.1 However, the ALJ found that the parties had entered 
into a collective bargaining agreement that had a provision "containing terms that mirror 
the rights and obligations under the Act" and, therefore, determined that the dispute 
was properly deferred to the parties' contractual grievance procedure, which ends in 
binding arbitration. He conditionally dismissed the charge, subject to a motion to renew 
under the criteria set forth in New York City Transit Authority (Bordansky).2 
The Association excepts to the ALJ's decision on the law and the BOCES 
supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the ALJ, and remand the matter to him for further proceedings 
consistent with our decision herein. 
FACTS 
The parties entered into a stipulation of fact upon which the ALJ based his 
decision. As here relevant, the Association was investigating a potential grievance 
regarding the filling of two vacant positions. On March 28 and May 2, 2000, the 
Association president requested that BOCES provide certain information relevant to its 
investigation. On April 7 and June 15, 2000, respectively, BOCES denied the requests 
for information, stating that the BOCES did not release information pertaining to the 
1See Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free Sch. Dist, 33 PERB p 0 5 9 (2000). 
24PERBP031 (1971). 
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interview process to fill vacancies. On June 23, 2000, the Association filed its grievance 
alleging that certain contractual provisions regarding the posting and filling of vacant 
positions had been violated by BOCES. On June 23, 2000, the Association filed the 
instant charge.3 
Section 33.2(d) of the parties' collective bargaining agreement provides that: 
There shall be made available to appropriate Association 
representatives all relevant materials, documents, 
communications and records concerning a grievance, unless 
same are confidential, such as personnel pre-hire 
information, psychological reports, etc. While such material 
may be copied by the Association, the furnishing of copies 
thereof will be solely discretionary with the Superintendent. 
DISCUSSION 
A refusal to provide information is typically the subject of a charge alleging a 
refusal to negotiate under § 209-a.1 (d) of the Act; In City of Rochester,4 we held that an 
employer's improper refusal of a demand for information also violates §209-a.1(a) of the 
Act. 
The denial of a reasonable demand for information which is 
relevant to collective negotiations, grievance adjustment, the 
administration of a collective bargaining agreement, or the 
resolution of impasses arising in the course of collective 
negotiations impairs the union's ability to effectively 
represent the interests of the employees in its unit. By 
rendering the union less able to represent the interests of its 
unit employees, an employer which improperly refuses a 
3As of the date of the ALJ's decision, the Association had not received the 
requested information. 
429 PERB 1J3070, at 3165 (1996). 
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demand for information interferes perse with the statutory 
rights of its employees, in violation of § 209-a.1(a) of the Act. 
In a recent decision,5 we reiterated our recognition "that the right of public 
employees to be represented in grievances is one of the most important afforded them 
by the Act and that the withholding of relevant grievance information necessarily 
interferes with that right." However, an employee organization's right to necessary 
information is not unfettered. We long ago found that the obligation of a public employer 
to provide information to an employee organization is circumscribed by rules of 
reasonableness, including the burden on the employer, the availability of the 
information elsewhere, the necessity of the information and its relevancy and materiality 
to the grievance being investigated or processed.6 
Here, the Association alleges that the refusal of BOCES to provide it with the 
requested information violates both §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Act. In its answer to the 
charge, BOCES alleges that the language of §33.2(d) of its contract with the 
Association provides the Association with a procedure for obtaining the requested 
information. Because we do not have jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a collective 
5Greenburgh No.11 Union Free Sch. Dist., supra note 1, at 3165. 
6
 Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of Albany, 6 PERB Tf3012 
(1973). 
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bargaining agreement,7 BOCES argues that PERB does not have jurisdiction over this 
charge.8 
In making our jurisdictional determination, the Association's two allegations must 
be viewed separately. As we stated in City of Albany,9 
[a]lthough-we have jurisdiction over the subparagraph (a) 
and (c) allegations, we do not by virtue of that fact 
automatically acquire jurisdiction over the subparagraph (d) 
allegation. The jurisdictional inquiry under § 205.5(d) of the 
Act is issue oriented. Each allegation in the charge must be 
considered separately in determining whether we have been 
empowered to consider the merits of the particular 
allegation. 
We turn first to the alleged violation of §209-a.1(a) of the Act. After determining 
that PERB has exclusive jurisdiction over the alleged (a) violation,10 the ALJ deferred a 
7Act, §205.5(d). 
8
"A jurisdictional issue is properly raised at any stage of a proceeding (footnote 
omitted), including by the board on exceptions, even if the issue has not been raised by 
a party or the administrative law judge...." Jerome Lefkowitz, et al., Public Sector Labor 
and Employment Law 651 (2d ed. 1988). 
925 PERB H3006, at 3020 (1992). 
10
 The ALJ found that an analysis of the language of §33.2(d) of the parties' 
contract established a waiver of the Association's statutory right to receive information. 
We do not consider the waiver arguments raised by the ALJ. BOCES' answer alleges 
only that PERB does not have jurisdiction over the charge by virtue of the language in 
§33.2(d) of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. "Waiver by contract and lack of 
jurisdiction are fundamentally different concepts. Lack of jurisdiction is not an affirmative 
defense and it need not be raised in an answer because jurisdiction relates to our 
power to hear and decide a case. Waiver, however, affects only the disposition on the 
merits of the particular improper practice charge or an issue arising thereunder. Waiver 
is an affirmative defense which must be raised in the answer if the defense is to be 
properly considered." Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist, 24 PERB 1J3047, at 3096-97 (1991) 
and cases cited therein. 
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determination on the merits of the alleged violation of §209-a.1(a) of the Act based 
upon his analysis of our decision in City of Cohoes (hereafter, Cohoes)." We reverse 
his decision in this regard. 
Initially, we note that the language of §33.2(d) of the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement does not mirror the language of §209-a.1(a) of the Act. Section 
33.2(d) provides that the Association will receive information concerning a grievance, 
with limitations as to confidentiality. Our decisions interpreting §209-a.1(a) of the Act 
have concluded that §209-a.1(a) is violated when a public employer improperly refuses 
to provide an employee organization with information relevant and material to the 
investigation or processing of a grievance. At best, the language of §33.2(d) of the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement provides the Association with rights similar to 
those which we have determined flow from §209-a.1 (a) of the Act. 
The ALJ read our decision in Cohoes, which found that "if the subject proposed 
for negotiation by employer or union otherwise embraces a term and condition of 
employment, that the bargaining proposal duplicates in whole or part the language of a 
statute is not, by itself, reason to treat the proposal as a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation,"12 as support for his analysis that where the parties to a bargaining 
1131 PERB P020 (1998), on remand in part, 32 PERB ^4561, aff'd in part, rev'd 
in part, 32 PERB ^3046 (1999), confirmed sub nom. Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes, 
Local 2562, IAFF v. Cuevas, 32 PERB 1J7026 (Sup. Ct. Albany County), aff'd, 276 
AD2d 184, 33 PERB 1J7019 (3d Dep't 2000), motion for leave to appeal denied, 
AD2d , 34 PERB fl7004 (3d Dep't 2001), motion for leave to appeal pending. 
Id. at 3043. 
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relationship have negotiated an agreement containing terms that mirror the rights and 
obligations under the Act, merits deferral may be appropriate where the charge alleges 
a failure to abide by the same statutory rights. Our decision in Cohoes dealt only with 
the mandatory nature of a demand which sought to restate or reiterate statutory 
language. We there found that the reiteration of statutory rights alone was not a 
sufficient reason for finding a demand to be nonmandatory. We recognized that one of 
the reasons that had been given in support of a determination that such a demand was 
nonmandatory was that the demand was redundant. In rejecting that rationale in 
Cohoes, we stated, as here relevant, that "[a]s the reiteration of statutory language in a 
contract or award is the potential source of additional and different rights and remedies, 
bargaining demands with that purpose or effect can never be 'redundant'."13 (Emphasis 
added.) 
Given our emphasis in Cohoes that the negotiation of language that reiterates or 
restates statutory ianguage might weii give parties additional rights, that decision can 
not be read as an indication that we are prepared to abandon our long-held position 
that we will not defer alleged violations of §209-a.1(a) of the Act,14 where the alleged 
violation of (a) is not purely derivative of the alleged (d) violation.15 
13/d 
14City of Albany, 25 PERB P006 (1992); Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist, 19 PERB 
113045(1986). 
15See County of Westchester, 30 PERB 1J3059 (1997). 
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Further, we are not inclined to follow the ALJ's rationale that to give effect to our 
decision in Cohoeswe should find that if language in a collective bargaining agreement 
reiterates language in the Act, we will defer to the parties' contractual grievance 
procedure a determination that the contract and, thus, §209-a.1(a) of the Act has been 
violated. Indeed, the ALJ recognized that such a deferral may be inappropriate where 
the remedies available to an arbitrator cannot adequately effectuate the policies of the 
Act or where the factual allegations suggest that the alleged violation may be flagrant or 
egregious. 
The litigation before PERB of an improper practice charge alleging a violation of 
§209-a.1(a) of the Act differs significantly from the arbitration of a grievance alleging the 
violation of a contractual provision that restates the provisions of that section of the Act. 
The standard of proof differs, the nature of the proceeding itself is different in the two 
forums and the arbitrator is limited to a determination only as to whether the contract 
has been violated.16 Even the courts have noted the unique nature of the litigation of an 
improper practice charge, the standards of proof necessary and the criteria which must 
be met if PERB is to defer to the decision of an arbitrator or hearing officer in a 
companion grievance or disciplinary hearing.17 
16See Addison Cent. Sen. Disi, 17 PERB P076, at 3116 (1984). "Deferrai is 
discretionary and is not usually applied when a violation of §209-a.1(a) is alleged.... The 
arbitrators remedied violations of the contract. We are remedying flagrant violations of 
§209-a.1(a), (d) and (e) of the law. 
17See Civil Serv. Emp. Ass'n v. PERB, 32 PERB 1J7027 (3d Dep't 1999); City of 
Albany v. PERB, 57 AD2d 374 (3d Dep't 1977). See also, State of New York (Dep't of 
Mental Hygiene), 11 PERB ff 3084 (1978); New York City Transit Auth. (Bordansky), 
supra note 2. 
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This is not to say that if the parties intend to have such a dispute heard by an 
arbitrator, they cannot negotiate an election of forums, in addition to reiterating or 
restating statutory rights in their collective bargaining agreements. We have found that 
parties may elect a different forum by a clear, unmistakable and unambiguous clause in 
their collective bargaining agreement that selects arbitration or a court proceeding to 
decide disputes that might also constitute an improper practice charge.18 Such clauses 
do not divest us of improper practice jurisdiction, as indeed, they cannot, but instead 
waive the parties' right to proceed before us. 
For all these reasons, we hold that we will not defer an alleged violation of §209-
a.1(a) of the Act simply because there is a provision in the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement that restates or reiterates the language of §209-a.1 (a) or provides rights 
similar to those found by PERB to flow from §209-a.1(a) of the Act. 
We now examine the §209-a.1(d) allegation. We first determine that we will not 
defer the aiieged (d) violation under our jurisdictional deferrai poiicy first articulated in 
Herkimer County BOCES.™ Where, as here, the (d) violation is inextricably intertwined 
with the alleged (a) violation, we do not defer a determination on the jurisdictional 
issues raised by contract language which touches upon the subject-matter of the 
charge.20 
18See City ofNewburgh, 31 PERB 1J3044 (1998), reversed sub nom. Local 589 
Intn'IAss'n of Fire Fighters v. Cuevas, 31 PERB 1J7002, (Sup. Ct. Orange County 
1999), rev'd, 271 AD2d 535, 31 PERB j[7004 (3d Dep't 2000); Board of Educ. of the 
City Sch. Dist of the City of Buffalo, 22 PERB If 3047 (1989). 
1920 PERB H3050(1987). 
City of Albany, supra note 14. 
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Having determined that we will not defer the jurisdictional issues raised by the (d) 
allegation, we must now determine whether we have jurisdiction over the alleged (d) 
violation. We find that we do have jurisdiction over this allegation.21 Section 205.5(d) of 
the Act reserves to PERB jurisdiction over an alleged violation of an agreement that 
would "otherwise constitute an improper employer practice...." We have held in certain 
matters where there is contractual language related to the subject-matter of the charge, 
if there exists an independent, statutory right with respect to the subject-matter, we 
retain jurisdiction even if the respondent's action is also arguably in violation of the 
contract language.22 
Having determined that we have jurisdiction over the alleged §209-a.1(d) 
violation, we move to a consideration of whether we should defer a decision on the 
merits to the parties' contractual grievance procedure. Entirely apart from our 
jurisdictional deferral policy, we have had a policy of much longer duration under which 
consideration of the merits of certain charges within our jurisdiction is deferred when a 
contractual grievance has been filed under a grievance procedure ending in binding 
arbitration.23 However, where, as here, there are other alleged violations over which we 
21ln his decision, the ALJ references two prior ALJ decisions, Schuyler-
Chemung-Tioga BOCES, 15 PERB 1J4552 (1982) and Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga 
BOCES, 18 PERB fl4606 (1985), where the parties' contractual language was identical 
to §33.2(d), as dismissing for lack of jurisdiction charges which alleged a violation of 
§209-a.1 (d).The first ALJ's dismissal was jurisdictional, but the later ALJ decision found 
jurisdiction over the (d) allegation, then deferred a decision on the merits of that 
allegation. To the extent that these decisions are contrary to our holdings in this case, 
they may be distinguished on the basis of later Board decisions which are cited herein. 
22City of Buffalo (Fire Dep't), 17 PERB 1J3090 (1984). 
State of New York (SUNY Health Science Center), 30 PERB 1J3019 (1997). 
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have exclusive jurisdiction, we have determined not to bifurcate the proceedings and 
have retained jurisdiction over all the allegations in the charge.24 
The ALJ, having deferred a determination on the merits of both the (a) and (d) 
allegations to the parties' contractual grievance procedure, did not decide either of 
those alleged violations. We find that it is appropriate, given the facts of this case, to 
remand the matter to the ALJ for a decision on the merits. 
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the decision of the ALJ and remand 
the matter to him for further action consistent with this decision. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: May 1,2001 
Albany, New York 
i^ /^^C^t-a^X/—V-vutX - «• , 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/
 IVfarc^A. Abbott, Member 
/ j John T. Mitchell, Member 
24 Supra note 14. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
(District) has filed exceptions to rulings made by the Director of Conciliation (Director) in 
conjunction with impasse proceedings initiated by the United Federation of Teachers 
under §209.3 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) arid Part 205 of our 
Rules of Procedure (Rules). The Federation has filed a response to the District's 
exceptions to the Director's determination that an impasse exists between the parties 
and the Director's appointment of a mediator. 
The District alleges in its exceptions that the parties have not reached an 
impasse in their collective negotiations and that the Federation's declaration was, 
therefore, premature. The Federation responds that there has been little progress in 
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the parties' negotiations and that there remains a large rift separating the parties on 
major issues, including salary.1 
The Director reviewed the District's exceptions to the Federation's declaration of 
impasse and a response to the District's exceptions filed by the Federation. He 
thereafter met with the parties and then appointed a mediator on April 6,2001. 
We have for many years reviewed Director determinations involving the dispute 
resolution provisions of the Act and Rules.2 Our right and power to review staff 
determinations is inherent in our delegation3 to those persons of the power to make 
them. Moreover, our review is necessary for there to be a final order which can be 
appealed judicially.4 
Notwithstanding our ability to review determinations made by the Director, 
allegations that an impasse has been declared prematurely usually take the form of 
improper practice charges filed pursuant to §209-a.1 (d) or §209-a.2(b) of the Act.5 We 
1The most recent collective bargaining agreement between the Federation and 
the District expired on November 15, 2000. We note that §209.1 of the Act provides that 
an impasse may be deemed to exist if the parties fail to achieve agreement at least one 
hundred twenty days prior to the end of the fiscal year of the public employer. 
2Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 30 PERB P009 (1997) (subsequent history 
omitted); County of Oneida and Oneida Co. Sheriff, 20 PERB 1J3044 (1987); Village of 
Southampton, 16 PERB 1J3049, aff'd 16 PERB 1J7026 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1983). 
3Act, §205.4(a) and §205.5(k). 
ARussell v. PERB, 13 PERB 1J7015 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1980). 
5See Deposit Cent. Sch. Dist, 27 PERB 1J3020 (1994), aff'd, 27 PERB 1J7017 
(Sup. Ct. Delaware County 1994), aff'd, 214 AD2d 288, 28 PERB ^7013 (3d Dep't 
1995), motion for leave to appeal denied, 88 NY2d 866, 29 PERB 1J7007 (1996);County 
of Wayne, 14 PERB fl3092 (1981); Bellport Teachers Ass'n, Inc., 6 PERB 1J3018 
(1973). 
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have, however reviewed decisions of the Director in other matters involving the 
statutory dispute resolution procedures, such as determinations on petitions for 
compulsory interest arbitration.6 
Here, after meeting several times over the space of seven months, the 
Federation declared impasse and requested that the Director appoint a mediator. The 
Director considered the written submissions of both parties and met with the parties 
before he concluded that an impasse existed and a mediator should be appointed.7 
Having reviewed the facts and arguments submitted by the District and the 
Federation, we confirm the designation of a mediator by the Director in this matter. SO 
ORDERED. 
DATED: May 1,2001 
Albany, New York 
6See, e.g., Yates Co. and Yates Co. Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n, 16 PERB 1[8001 
(1982). 
7There is here no dispute that PERB has the authority to determine the existence 
of an impasse in collective negotiations and to appoint a mediator. See City of 
Newburgh v. PERB, 97 AD2d 258 (3d Dep't 1983). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL, 456, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-GIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C- 4865 
YONKERS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
Employer, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
iT iS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Locai 456, international Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
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exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: Accountant, Assistant Supervisor of School Facilities 
and Operations, Assistant Supervisor of School Food 
Service I, Assistant Supervisor of School Food Service 
II, Personal Computer Specialist, Programmer, 
Programmer Supervisor, Senior Personal Computer 
Specialist, Senior Software Programmer, Supervisor of 
Accounts Payable, Chief Clerk, Assistant Supervisor 
Custodians, Assistant Supervisor Maintenance, 
Supervisor of Transportation, Planner of School 
Facilities, Project Coordinator/Construction, Purchasing 
Agent, 
Excluded: Accounting Analyst, Assistant Superintendent 
(Operation Services), Assistant to the Director of 
Personnel, Chief Accountant, Director of Management 
Information Services, Director of Research and 
Evaluation, Employee Benefits Manager, Executive 
Assistant to the Board of Education, Executive Secretary 
to the Superintendent, Human Resources Manager, 
Secretary to the Superintendent of Schools, Senior 
Budget Analyst, Supervisor of School Facilities and 
Operations, Supervisor of School Food Service 
Programs. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with Local 456, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
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execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 1,2001 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
| TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294, 
i 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5064 
VILLAGE OF MENANDS, 
i • • • 
Employer, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, . 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 294 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Included: All full-time and regular part-time employees in the Water, Street 
and Sanitation departments. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 294. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: May 1,2001 
Albany, New York 
IAASL^^UUA. l<~-^^ <^X^~ 
Mfehael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
Dohn T. Mitchell, IvTember 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION #693, 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, 
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF 
AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5063 
TOWN OF BINGHAMTON, 
Employer, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local Union #693, international 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-
CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-
named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
Certification - C-5063 - 2 -
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Included: Heavy and light equipment operators. 
Excluded: Highway superintendent, deputy highway superintendent, secretary 
to the highway superintendent and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local Union #693, International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO. The duty 
to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, of the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 1,2001 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 138, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5066 
VILLAGE OF GREAT NECK, 
Employer, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Union of Operating Engineers, 
Local 138 has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
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the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All employees in the titles of Public Works Laborers, 
MEOs (highway) and MEOs (Sanitation). 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 138. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 1,2001 
Albany, New York 
T. Mitchell, Memtref 
